Testimonial to a Railwayman - 1854

The increasingly professional early railways also saw the the development of a community spirit amongst railway workers. Indeed, this was exemplified by the testimonial, where groups of railway workers would present their colleagues with gifts to celebrate their long service or achievements. Indeed, this case, from 1854, is a prime example that shows how managers could be respected by their piers and subordinates:

"We have much pleasure in recording a gratifying tribute of respect and esteem which has been paid to Mr Ashbee, the worthy and efficient superintendent of the Gloucester branch of the Great Western Railway, by the clerks porters, and general servants on that portion of the company's line extending from Swindon to the junction with the Hereford, Ross and Gloucester line. The event to which we allude took place on Friday, at the Wellington Hotel, near the Great Western station, where a number of clerks and servants of the company, stationed between Gloucester and Swindon, assembled under the presidency of Mr Forbes, the manager of the goods department at Paddington. The testimonial consisted of a handsome silver teapot, sugur-basin, and cream-ewer, from the manufactory of Mr Mann, the Cross, and bore the following inscription:- "this tea services is presented to John Ashbee, Esq., as a token of the high esteem in which he is held by the men employed under him on the Gloucester branch of the Great Western Railway, Jan. 20, 1854"[1]

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[1] Jackson's Oxford Journal, Saturday, January 28, 1854

PhD Historiography Snippet: The Power of the Victorian Railway Chief Executive

Naturally, as companies expanded physically the management class grew to coordinate the increased operations. Studies have shown how this, in some cases, brought it into conflict with directors which Wilson and Thomson called ‘trustees of investors’ proprietorial rights.’[1]  Amongst early railway managers, London and North Western Railway General Manager, Mark Huish, had a reputation for being ‘unscrupulous, dictatorial and Machiavellian’ in his control of company policy between 1846 and 1858. Yet, while Gourvish argued that none of Huish’s contemporaries had his ‘predominance in railway affairs’, he also made the case that ‘Huish was not the company’s sole policy maker and he did not possess the ‘dictatorial’ influence so often ascribed to him.’ Indeed, he encountered the resistance of the directors to delegate power to salaried officials[2] and in 1858 his resignation was forced upon him as he could not satisfy the director’s requirements regarding inter-company diplomacy.[3] Lastly, on his resignation his successor, Cawkwell, had far greater controls placed on his freedom of action by the board.[4]

Indeed, this case shows that whether managers controlled or influenced policy were two different matters. Clearly, by the 1860s the influence of senior managers, verses those of directors, varied within different companies. Decision-making could become heavily influenced by chief executives, a small group of directors, or both. When Channon examined the building of the Midland Railway’s main line to London, opened in 1868, he argued the decision was formulated by a small number of directors who were influenced heavily by the General Manager, James Allport.[5] Furthermore, Gourvish argued in respect of the railways managed by Watkin and Forbes that ‘company strategies are usually presented in terms of either the directorship of a managing director or of one or two active directors.’[6]

Despite Cain arguing that by the 1870s Chief Executives were ‘the single most important decision-makers in the industry,’[7] the reality was that different managers continued to have varied levels of control over  company policies after 1870. In his study of Edward Watkin, chairman of the Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire Railway (1864-1894), South Eastern (1866-1894) and Metropolitan Railways (1872-1894), and James Staats Forbes, chairman of the London, Chatham and Dover (1873-1898) and Metropolitan District Railways (1872-1901), he wrote of two railwaymen who remained in control of the companies’ policies, even when promoted onto their boards. Nevertheless, there were attempts by the SER board to oust Watkin in 1878-79 and 1885-86. [8]

Sir George Gibb

Furthermore, despite Watkin dedicating a large portion of his time to railway work, he was unable to directly control the three companies he was managing director of, relying on the senior executives at each to run operations; Myles Fenton at the SER, William Pollitt at the MS&LR and John Bell at the Metropolitan.[9] Hodgkins even described how Pollitt and Bell had a long standing rivalry which would have made a proposed link between the MS&L and Metropolitan Railways in the 1890s difficult,[10] and suggesting that even under Watkin’s domineering leadership these chief executives had the status and influence to direct their railways’ policies.

As late as the 1890s management’s ability to influence and control policy was different from company to company. Irving argued in his study of the North Eastern Railway (NER) that when Gibb became General Manager in 1891 he almost completely controlled company decision-making, dominating the staff and board, and allowing him to drag the company ‘to a position where it was acknowledged by experts to be a model on which successful railway management might be based.’ Nonetheless, on his departure in 1906 a vacuum was left and that thereafter the new General Manager, Butterworth, did not have the handle on company affairs, allowing the board to reassert its position at the heart of company policy.[11] Furthermore, Klapper’s portrait of Sir Herbert Walker’s administration of the London & South Western Railway from 1912 is one that highlights the primacy of the General Manager in policy, rather than the directorate.[12]

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[1] Wilson, John F. and Thomson, Andrew, The Making of Modern Management: British Management in Historical Perspective, (Oxford, 2009), p.57

[2] Gourvish, T.R. Mark Huish and the London & North Western Railway, (Leicester, 1972) , p.167-182

[3] Gourvish, Mark Huish and the London & North Western Railway, p.257-260

[4] Gourvish, Mark Huish and the London & North Western Railway, p.177

[5] Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.107

[6] Gourvish, T.R. ‘The performance of British railway management after 1860: The railways of Watkin and Forbes’, Business History, 20 (1978) p.188-189

[7] Cain, P.J., ‘Railways 1870-1914: the maturity of the private system,’ in Freeman, Michael J. and Aldcroft, Derek H. (eds.) Transport in Victorian Britain, (Manchester, 1988), p.112

[8] Gourvish, ‘The performance of British railway management after 1860’, p.188-189

[9] Gourvish, ‘The performance of British railway management after 1860’, p.191

[10] Hodgkins, David, The Second Railway King: The Life and Times of Sir Edward Watkin, (Melton Priory, 2002)   p.609

[11] Irving, R.J., The North Eastern Railway Company, (Leicester, 1976)  p.261-264

[12] Klapper, C.F., Sir Herbert Walker’s Southern Railway, (London, 1973)

Retaining 'good' Clerks at the Cost of Innovation

I am always interested in why railway management in the late nineteenth century stagnated in terms of ideas. It should be remembered, that in the period the vast majority of companies' influential managers came from the clerical staff and from within the Traffic Department. Indeed, by the turn of the century, most senior managers had joined the companies as junior clerks in the 1870s and 1880s, had very fixed career paths and felt it was their right to advance up the promotional ladder. This meant that there were few new ideas coming into railway management as those below in the hierarchy simply filled the place of those who had left above them.

Yesterday, through the library, I acquired a copy of Michael Heller's new book London Clerical Workers 1880-1914. Heller quoted a memorandum from a Great Western Railway (GWR) manager, A.W. Solten, that explained why the company preferred new clerks and  managers to come from inside the company, rather than from externals sources; something they were considering but eventually dropped as an idea:

"Hitherto the practice has been to draw from the general staff to fill such positions, the men who, by their ability, zeal and assiduity, have singled themselves out for promotion outside the ordinary routine, and to whom the knowledge that the prizes of the service are open to all, has been an incentive to cultivate the good qualities they posses.
         The successful management and administration of a railway depend very largely on the zealous and capable discharge, by a contented staff, of duties, some of mere detail and routine, others involving in a greater or lesser degree the exercise of thought and judgement. To introduce into the service, however delicately, the mere suspicion that the chief positions are likley to be monopolized by a favoured few individuals, thereby arresting the natural flow of promotion through the service, would I feel convinced, causing a feeling of discontent which would operate to the detriment of the Company by reason of the removal to excel, which under existing circumstances tends to their benefit; and would also lead to the better men, who might leave the service for appointments outside such as would not otherwise attract them."

Therefore, Heller argued that the GWR was reluctant hire managers and clerks from outside the company because it would tie the individuals into it, mean low labour turnover and would motivate staff to improve themselves to advance up the hierarchy.[1] Yet, in a managerial sense, these things contributed to managerial innovation drying up within the late Victorian Railway, as the new managerial 'blood' simply replicated the practices of those who had gone before.

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[1] The National Archives, RAIL 258/400, Letter of A.W. Solten to G.K. Mills, 11 November 1900, in Heller, Michael, London Clerical Workers, 1880-1914, (London, 2011) p,52

Meet A Railway Luminary, No. 2: Archibald Scott

Archibald Scott was a grandee of the London and South Western Railway (L&SWR). He was born in Bell Street, Dundee, in 1821 to Archibald, a tanner, and Ann. The 1841 census shows that in that year he had four brothers and two sisters, and was listed as a clerk. However, it is unknown if this was within a railway company.[1] Nevertheless, he did work for the Edingburgh, Perth and Dundee, Edinburgh and Glasgow and North British Railway companies before being appointed as Traffic Manager of the L&SWR in 1852 at the  age of thirty-one.[2] The previous holder of the post had left the goods accounts in complete disarray and he immediately set about reforming them, as well as introducing undetermined management changes into the Traffic Department generally.[3]

In the 1860s he was responsible for establishing the Traffic Department's management structures. However, as the years passed he found it increasingly difficult to manage the growing business as he was unwilling to delegate power to subordinates.[4] Indeed, this was despite being made General Manager in 1870.[5] Furthermore, because he was so controlling Scott threw himself into his work, something he could easily do as he never married. In 1884 one proprietor noted that ‘I have known him to attend at your offices when all other people would expect to be, and would be at fireside.’ Furthermore, another comment from an unknown source was that ‘it is said towards Paddington that you must rise very early in the morning to be up to him.’[6]

Despite this, the company's performance declined because of his controlling nature in the 1870s and early 1880s. Indeed, when given 'more general' control of the company in 1881 he began attempting to influence the activities of all the L&SWR's departments in just as much detail as in the Traffic Department. Yet, he was a traffic manager, and had never learnt anything to do with the organisation of the company's engineering sections, for example the Locomotive Department. Indeed, he clashed with the company's Locomotive Superintendent, William Adams. Thus, he eventually failed to gain influence in areas outside his own understanding, and the company's performance continued to decline.[7]

Nevertheless, Scott was a kind and benevolent senior manager and The South Western Gazette stated that he 'was of a sympathetic nature, open handed and ever-ready to give relief of the unfortunate and distressed, and many of the older servants of the S.W.R. company can bear witness to his benevolence.'[8] Indeed, he established within the company such a community spirit that in the national railway strike of 1911 the L&SWR was the only railway whose staff did not come out.[9]

After coming under much pressure from the public because of the L&SWR's poor public services, some of which I related in a Turnip Rail Blog Post, he retired at the end of 1884 at the age of sixty-three.[10] He took up a position on the board, from which he retired in 1902 because of ill-health. It was said that after ending his time as a director he never travelled on a train again.[11] He died on the 6 December1910 at his house in South Bank, Surbiton,[12] and was buried on the 9 December at Kingston Cemetery.[13]

The photo above is the only known image of Scott. The South Western Gazette stated that Scott had a 'an insurmountable objection to having his portrait taken.' However, the image shown is was a snapshot taken by 'a friend' in the days before he retired as a director.[12]

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[1] National Archives of Scotland [NAS], Unknown Reference, 1841 Census, Dundee, Forfarsh, p282
[2] South Western Gazette, December 1884, p.4
[3] Williams, R.A. The London and South Western Railway: Volume 1, The Formative Years, (Newton Abbott, 1968), p.219-220
[4] Honestly, read my PhD thesis in October.
[5] Williams, R.A. The London and South Western Railway: Volume 2, Growth and Consolidation, (Newton Abbott, 1973), p.298
[6]Williams, The London and South Western Railway: Volume 2, p298
[7] Again, read my Thesis in October.
[8] South Western Gazette, December 1884, p.4
[9] South Western Gazette, January 1911, p.8
[10] Faulkner J.N. And Williams R.A., The London and South Western Railway in the Twentieth Century, (Newton Abbott, 1988) p.189
[11] South Western Gazette, January 1911, p.8
[12] The Times, Wednesday December 7, p.13
[13]  South Western Gazette, January 1911, p.8

PhD snippet: Early management structures - A Bit of Historiography

Wilson and Thomson argued that in the railways' formative years, British railway executives ‘responded poorly’ to the challenges that these new complex organisations presented them with given there were no blueprints for their organisation.[1] Indeed, while Bonavia suggested that the structures of company boards and sub-committees, which deliberated on separate company functions, appeared early on in most railway companies,[2] the structures of management below them did not become established in most companies until the mid-1840s or 1850s.

Wilson and Thomson argued that it was the substantially larger companies that were created out of the mergers of the mid-1840s that forced executives to experiment with management structures, the most noticeable case being that of Captain Mark Huish on the London and North Western Railway (L&NWR).[3] Indeed, Hodgkins describes Sir Edward Watkin’s role in addressing managerial challenges within the L&NWR in the late 1840s and 1850s, such as the ‘advantages and disadvantages of contracting out maintenance’ and building up information systems[4]

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[1] Wilson, John F. and Thomson, Andrew, The Making of Modern Management: British Management in Historical Perspective, (Oxford, 2009), p.57

[2] Bonavia, Michael, R. The Organisation of British Railways, (Shepperton, 1971), p.12

[3] Wilson, and Thomson, The Making of Modern Management, p.57

[4] Hodgkins, David, The Second Railway King: The Life and Times of Sir Edward Watkin, (Landybie, 2002), p.71-73